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Abstract. This issue of Statistical Science draws its inspiration from
the work of James M. Robins. Jon Wellner, the Editor at the time,
asked the two of us to edit a special issue that would highlight the
research topics studied by Robins and the breadth and depth of Robins’
contributions. Between the two of us, we have collaborated closely with
Jamie for nearly 40 years. We agreed to edit this issue because we
recognized that we were among the few in a position to relate the
trajectory of his research career to date.1
Many readers may be unfamiliar with Robins’ sin-
gular career trajectory and in particular how his
early practical experience motivated many of the in-
ferential problems with which he was subsequently
involved. Robins majored in mathematics at Har-
vard College, but then, in the spirit of the times, left
college to pursue more activist social and political
goals. Several years later, Robins enrolled in Medical
School at Washington University in St. Louis, grad-
uating in 1976. His M.D. degree remains his only
degree, other than his high school diploma.
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1Here, we restrict attention to Robins’ contributions to the
research literature. Robins has also contributed by training
and mentoring leading researchers in causal inference: among
others, Elizabeth Halloran, Miguel Hernán, Eric Tchetgen
Tchetgen and Tyler VanderWeele worked with him as grad-
uate students. Both of the editors of this Special Issue were
greatly influenced by Robins’ as a graduate student and post-
doc and have been fortunate to have subsequently collabo-
rated with him over many years.
After graduating, he interned in medicine at
Harlem Hospital in New York. After completing the
internship, Robins spent a year working as a pri-
mary care physician in a community clinic in the
Roxbury neighborhood of Boston. During that year,
he helped organize a vertical Service Employees In-
ternational Union affiliate that included all salaried
personnel, from maintenance to physicians, working
at the health center. In retaliation, he was dismissed
by the director of the clinic and found that he was
somewhat unwelcome at the other Boston commu-
nity clinics. Unable to find a job and with his un-
employment insurance running out, he surprisingly
was able to obtain a prestigious residency in Inter-
nal Medicine at Yale University, a testament, he says
with some irony, to the enduring strength of one’s
Ivy League connections.
At Yale, Robins and his college friend Mark
Cullen, now head of General Medicine at Stan-
ford Medical School, founded an occupational health
clinic, with the goal of working with trade unions
in promoting occupational health and safety. When
testifying in workers’ compensation cases, Robins
was regularly asked whether it was “more probable
than not that a worker’s death or illness was caused
by exposure to chemicals in the workplace.” Robins’
lifelong interest in causal inference began with his
need to provide an answer. As the relevant scientific
papers consisted of epidemiologic studies and biosta-
tistical analyses, Robins enrolled in biostatistics and
epidemiology classes at Yale. He was dismayed to
learn that the one question he needed to answer was
the one question excluded from formal discussion
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in the mainstream biostatistical literature.2 At the
time, most biostatisticians insisted that evidence for
causation could only be obtained through random-
ized controlled trials; since, for ethical reasons, po-
tentially harmful chemicals could not be randomly
assigned, it followed that statistics could play little
role in disentangling causation from spurious corre-
lation.
1. CONFOUNDING
In his classes, Robins was struck by the gap
present between the informal, yet insightful, lan-
guage of epidemiologists such as Miettinen and Cook
(1981) expressed in terms of “confounding, compa-
rability, and bias,” and the technical language of
mathematical statistics in which these terms either
did not have analogs or had other meanings. Robins’
first major paper “The foundations of confounding
in Epidemiology” written in 1982, though only pub-
lished in 1987, was an attempt to bridge this gap. As
one example, he offered a precise mathematical def-
inition for the informal epidemiologic concept of a
“confounding variable” that has apparently stood
the test of time (see VanderWeele and Shpitser,
2013). As a second example, Efron and Hinkley
(1978) had formally considered inference accurate to
order n−3/2 in variance conditional on exact or ap-
proximate ancillary statistics. Robins showed, sur-
prisingly, that long before their paper, epidemiolo-
gists had been intuitively and informally referring to
an estimator as “unbiased” just when it was asymp-
totically unbiased conditional on either exact or ap-
proximate ancillary statistics; furthermore, they in-
tuitively required that the associated conditional
Wald confidence interval be accurate to O(n−3/2) in
variance. As a third example, he solved the prob-
lem of constructing the tightest Wald-type intervals
2Robins and Greenland (1989a, 1989b) provided a formal
definition of the probability of causation and a definitive an-
swer to the question in the following sense. They proved that
the probability of causation was not identified from epidemi-
ologic data even in the absence of confounding, but that
sharp upper and lower bounds could be obtained. Specifi-
cally, under the assumption that a workplace exposure was
never beneficial, the probability P (t) that a workers death
occurring t years after exposure was due to that exposure
was sharply upper bounded by 1 and lower bounded by
max[0,{f1(t) − f0(t)}/f1(t)], where f1(t) and f0(t) are, re-
spectively, the marginal densities in the exposed and unex-
posed cohorts of the random variable T encoding time to
death.
guaranteed to have conservative coverage for the av-
erage causal effect among the n study subjects par-
ticipating in a completely randomized experiment
with a binary response variable; he showed that this
interval can be strictly narrower than the usual bino-
mial interval even under the Neyman null hypothesis
of no average causal effect. To do so, he constructed
an estimator of the variance of the empirical differ-
ence in treatment means that improved on a vari-
ance estimator earlier proposed by Neyman (1923).
Aronow, Green and Lee (2014) have recently gener-
alized this result in several directions including to
nonbinary responses.
2. TIME-DEPENDENT CONFOUNDING AND
THE g-FORMULA
It was also in 1982 that Robins turned his atten-
tion to the subject that would become his grail:
causal inference from complex longitudinal data
with time-varying treatments, that eventually cul-
minated in his revolutionary papers Robins (1986,
1987b). His interest in this topic was sparked by (i) a
paper of Gilbert (1982)3 on the healthy worker sur-
vivor effect in occupational epidemiology, wherein
the author raised a number of questions Robins an-
swered in these papers and (ii) his medical experi-
ence of trying to optimally adjust a patient’s treat-
ments in response to the evolution of the patient’s
clinical and laboratory data.
2.1 Overview
Robins career from this point on became a “quest”
to solve this problem, and thereby provide meth-
ods that would address central epidemiological ques-
tions, for example, is a given long-term exposure
harmful or a treatment beneficial? If beneficial, what
interventions, that is, treatment strategies, are opti-
mal or near optimal?
In the process, Robins created a “bestiary” of
causal models and analytic methods.4 There are the
basic “phyla” consisting of the g-formula, marginal
structural models and structural nested models.
These phyla then contain “species,” for example,
structural nested failure time models, structural
3The author, Ethel Gilbert, is the mother of Peter Gilbert
who is a contributor to this special issue; see (Richardson
et al. (2014)).
4In the epidemiologic literature, this bestiary is sometimes
referred to as the collection of “g-methods.”
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nested distribution models, structural nested (multi-
plicative additive and logistic) mean models and yet
further “subspecies”: direct-effect structural nested
models and optimal-regime structural nested mod-
els.
Each subsequent model in this taxa was developed
to help answer particular causal questions in specific
contexts that the “older siblings” were not quite up
to. Thus, for example, Robins’ creation of structural
nested and marginal structural models was driven
by the so-called null paradox, which could lead to
falsely finding a treatment effect where none existed,
and was a serious nonrobustness of the estimated g-
formula, his then current methodology. Similarly, his
research on higher-order influence function estima-
tors was motivated by a concern that, in the pres-
ence of confounding by continuous, high dimensional
confounders, even doubly robust methods might fail
to adequately control for confounding bias.
This variety also reflects Robins’ belief that the
best analytic approach varies with the causal ques-
tion to be answered, and, even more importantly,
that confidence in one’s substantive findings only
comes when multiple, nearly orthogonal, modeling
strategies lead to the same conclusion.
2.2 Causally Interpreted Structured Tree Graphs
Suppose one wishes to estimate from longitudi-
nal data the causal effect of time-varying treat-
ment or exposure, say cigarette smoking, on a fail-
ure time outcome such as all-cause mortality. In
this setting, a time-dependent confounder is a time-
varying covariate (e.g., presence of emphysema) that
is a predictor of both future exposure and of fail-
ure. In 1982, the standard analytic approach was
to model the conditional probability (i.e., the haz-
ard) of failure time t as a function of past expo-
sure history using a time-dependent Cox propor-
tional hazards model. Robins formally showed that,
even when confounding by unmeasured factors and
model specification are absent, this approach may
result in estimates of effect that may fail to have a
causal interpretation, regardless of whether or not
one also adjusts for the measured time-dependent
confounders in the analysis. In fact, if previous ex-
posure also predicts the subsequent evolution of the
time-dependent confounders (e.g., since smoking is
a cause of emphysema, it predicts this disease) then
the standard approach can find an artifactual expo-
sure effect even under the sharp null hypothesis of
no net, direct or indirect effect of exposure on the
failure time of any subject.
Prior to Robins (1986), although informal discus-
sions of net, direct and indirect (i.e., mediated) ef-
fects of time varying exposures were to be found
in the discussion sections of most epidemiologic pa-
pers, no formal mathematical definitions existed.
To address this, Robins (1986) introduced a new
counterfactual model, the finest fully randomized
causally interpreted structured tree graph (FFR-
CISTG)5 model that extended the point treatment
counterfactual model of Neyman (1923) and Rubin
(1974, 1978a)6 to longitudinal studies with time-
varying treatments, direct and indirect effects and
feedback of one cause on another. Due to his lack
of formal statistical training, the notation and for-
malisms in Robins (1986) differ from those found in
the mainstream literature; as a consequence the pa-
per can be a difficult read.7 Richardson and Robins
(2013, Appendix C) present the FFRCISTG model
using a more familiar notation.8
We illustrate the basic ideas using a simplified ex-
ample. Suppose that we obtain data from an obser-
5A complete list of acronyms used is given before the Ref-
erences.
6See Freedman (2006) and Sekhon (2008) for historical re-
views of the counterfactual point treatment model.
7Robins published an informal, accessible, summary of his
main results in the epidemiologic literature (Robins (1987a)).
However, it was not until 1992 (and many rejections) that his
work on causal inference with time-varying treatments ap-
peared in a major statistical journal.
8The perhaps more familiar Non-Parametric Structural
Equation Model with Independent Errors (NPSEM-IE) con-
sidered by Pearl may be viewed as submodel of Robins’ FFR-
CISTG.
A Non-Parametric Structural Equation Model (NPSEM)
assumes that all variables (V ) can be intervened on. In con-
trast, the FFRCISTG model does not require one to assume
this. However, if all variables in V can be intervened on, then
the FFRCISTG specifies a set of one-step ahead counterfac-
tuals, Vm(vm−1) which may equivalently be written as struc-
tural equations Vm(vm−1) = fm(vm−1, εm) for functions fm
and (vector-valued) random errors εm. Thus, leaving aside no-
tational differences, structural equations and one-step ahead
counterfactuals are equivalent. All other counterfactuals, as
well as factual variables, are then obtained by recursive sub-
stitution.
However, the NPSEM-IE model of Pearl (2000) further
assumes the errors εm are jointly independent. In contrast,
though an FFRCISTG model is also an NPSEM, the errors
(associated with incompatible counterfactual worlds) may be
dependent—though any such dependence could not be de-
tected in a RCT. Hence, Pearl’s model is a strict submodel of
an FFRCISTG model.
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vational or randomized study in which n patients
are treated at two times. Let A1 and A2 denote the
treatments. Let L be a measurement taken just prior
to the second treatment and let Y be a final out-
come, higher values of which are desirable. To sim-
plify matters, for now we will suppose that all of the
treatments and responses are binary. As a concrete
example, consider a study of HIV infected subjects
with (A1,L,A2, Y ), respectively, being binary indi-
cators of anti-retroviral treatment at time 1, high
CD4 count just before time 2, anti-retroviral ther-
apy at time 2, and survival at time 3 (where for
simplicity we assume no deaths prior to assignment
of A2). There are 2
4 = 16 possible observed data se-
quences for (A1,L,A2, Y ); these may be depicted as
an event tree as in Figure 1.9 Robins (1986) referred
to such event trees as “structured tree graphs.”
We wish to assess the effect of the two treatments
(a1, a2) on Y . In more detail, for a given subject
we suppose the existence of four potential outcomes
Fig. 1. Causal tree graph depicting a simple scenario with
treatments at two times A1, A2, a response L measured prior
to A2, and a final response Y . Blue circles indicate evolution
of the process determined by Nature; red dots indicate poten-
tial treatment choices.
9In practice, there will almost always exist baseline covari-
ates measured prior to A1. In that case, the analysis in the
text is to be understood as being with a given joint stratum of
a set of baseline covariates sufficient to adjust for confounding
due to baseline factors.
Y (a1, a2) for a1, a2 ∈ {0,1} which are the outcome
a patient would have if (possibly counter-to-fact)
they were to receive the treatments a1 and a2. Then
E[Y (a1, a2)] is the mean outcome (e.g., the survival
probability) if everyone in the population were to re-
ceive the specified level of the two treatments. The
particular instance of this regime under which ev-
eryone is treated at both times, so a1 = a2 = 1, is
depicted in Figure 4(a). We are interested in esti-
mation of these four means since the regime (a1, a2)
that maximizes E[Y (a1, a2)] is the regime a new pa-
tient exchangeable with the n study subjects should
follow.
There are two extreme scenarios: If in an obser-
vational study, the treatments are assigned, for ex-
ample, by doctors, based on additional unmeasured
predictors U of Y then E[Y (a1, a2)] is not identified
since those receiving (a1, a2) within the study are
not representative of the population as a whole.
At the other extreme, if the data comes from a
completely randomized clinical trial (RCT) in which
treatment is assigned independently at each time
by the flip of coin, then it is simple to see that the
counterfactual Y (a1, a2) is independent of the treat-
ments (A1,A2) and that the average potential out-
comes are identified since those receiving (a1, a2) in
the study are a simple random sample of the whole
population. Thus,
Y (a1, a2)⊥ {A1,A2},(1)
E[Y (a1, a2)] = E[Y |A1 = a1,A2 = a2],(2)
where the right-hand side of (2) is a function of the
observed data distribution. In a completely random-
ized experiment, association is causation: the associ-
ational quantity on the right-hand side of (2) equals
the causal quantity on the left-hand side.
Robins, however, considered an intermediate trial
design in which both treatments are randomized,
but the probability of receiving A2 is dependent
on both the treatment received initially (A1) and
the observed response (L); a scenario now termed
a sequential randomized trial. Robins viewed his
analysis as also applicable to observational data as
follows. In an observational study, the role of an
epidemiologist is to use subject matter knowledge
to try to collect in L sufficient data to eliminate
confounding by unmeasured factors, and thus to
have the study mimic a sequential RCT. If success-
ful, the only difference between an actual sequen-
tial randomized trial and an observational study is
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that in the former the randomization probabilities
Pr(A2 = 1 | L,A1) are known by design while in the
latter they must be estimated from the data.10
Robins viewed the sequential randomized trial as
a collection of five trials in total: the original trial
at t= 1, plus a set of four randomized trials at t= 2
nested within the original trial.11 Let the counter-
factual L(a1) be the outcome L when A1 is set to
a1. Since the counterfactuals Y (a1, a2) and L(a1) do
not depend on the actual treatment received, they
can be viewed, like a subject’s genetic make-up, as a
fixed (possibly unobserved) characteristic of a sub-
ject and therefore independent of the randomly as-
signed treatment conditional on pre-randomization
covariates. That is, for each (a1, a2) and l:
{Y (a1, a2),L(a1)} ⊥ A1,(3)
Y (a1, a2)⊥ A2 |A1 = a1, L= l.(4)
These independences suffice to identify the joint
density fY (a1,a2),L(a1)(y, l) of (Y (a1, a2),L(a1)) from
the distribution of the factual variables by the
“g-computation algorithm formula” (or simply g-
formula) density
f∗a1,a2(y, l)≡ f(y | a1, l, a2)f(l | a1)(5)
provided the conditional probabilities on the right-
hand side are well-defined (Robins, 1986, page
1423). Note that f∗a1,a2(y, l) is obtained from the
joint density of the factuals by removing the treat-
ment terms f(a2 | a1, l, a2)f(a1). This is in-line with
the intuition that A1 and A2 cease to be ran-
dom since, under the regime, they are set by in-
tervention to constants a1 and a2. The g-formula
was later referred to as the “manipulated density”
by Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993) and the
“truncated factorization” by Pearl (2000).
Robins (1987b) showed that under the weaker
condition that replaces (3) and (4) with
Y (a1, a2)⊥ A1 and
(6)
Y (a1, a2)⊥ A2 |A1 = a1, L= l,





f(y | a1, l, a2)f(l | a1),(7)
10Of course, one can never be certain that the epidemiolo-
gists were successful which is the reason RCTs are generally
considered the gold standard for establishing causal effects.
11That is, the trials starting at t= 2 are on study popula-
tions defined by specific (A1,L)-histories.
the marginal under f∗a1,a2(y, l).
12 Robins called (6)
randomization w.r.t. Y .13 Furthermore, he provided
substantive examples of observational studies in
which only the weaker assumption would be ex-
pected to hold. It is much easier to describe these
studies using representations of causal systems using
Directed Acyclic Graphs and Single World Interven-
tion Graphs, neither of which existed when (Robins
(1987b)) was written.
2.3 Causal DAGs and Single World Intervention
Graphs (SWIGs)
Causal DAGs were first introduced in the seminal
work of Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993); the
theory was subsequently developed and extended by
Pearl (1995a, 2000) among others.
A causal DAG with random variables V1, . . . , VM
as nodes is a graph in which (1) the lack of an arrow
from node Vj to Vm can be interpreted as the ab-
sence of a direct causal effect of Vj on Vm (relative
to the other variables on the graph), (2) all com-
mon causes, even if unmeasured, of any pair of vari-
ables on the graph are themselves on the graph, and
(3) the Causal Markov Assumption (CMA) holds.
The CMA links the causal structure represented by
the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) to the statistical
data obtained in a study. It states that the distribu-
tion of the factual variables factor according to the
DAG. A distribution factors according to the DAG
if nondescendants of a given variable Vj are indepen-
dent of Vj conditional on paj , the parents of Vj . The
CMA is mathematically equivalent to the statement
that the density f(v1, . . . , vM ) of the variables on the
causal DAG G satisfies the Markov factorization




A graphical criterion, called d-separation (Pearl
(1988)), characterizes all the marginal and condi-
tional independences that hold in every distribution
obeying the Markov factorization (8).
Causal DAGs may also be used to represent the
joint distribution of the observed data under the
counterfactual FFRCISTG model of Robins (1986).
12The g-formula density for Y is a generalization of stan-
dardization of effect measures to time varying treatments. See
Keiding and Clayton (2014) for a historical review of stan-
dardization.
13Note that the distribution of L(a1) is no longer identified
under this weaker assumption.
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Fig. 2. (a) A causal DAG G describing a sequentially randomized trial; (b) the SWIG G(a1, a2) resulting from intervening
on A1 and A2.
This follows because an FFRCISTG model over the
variables {V1, . . . , VM} induces a distribution that
factors as (8). Figure 2(a) shows a causal Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG) corresponding to the sequen-
tially randomized experiment described above: ver-
tex H represents an unmeasured common cause
(e.g., immune function) of CD4 count L and survival
Y . Randomization of treatment implies A1 has no
parents and A2 has only the observed variables A1
and L as parents.
Single-World Intervention Graphs (SWIGs), in-
troduced in (Richardson and Robins (2013)), pro-
vide a simple way to derive the counterfactual in-
dependence relations implied by an FFRCISTG
model. SWIGs were designed to unify the graphi-
cal and potential outcome approaches to causality.
The nodes on a SWIG are the counterfactual ran-
dom variables associated with a specific hypothet-
ical intervention on the treatment variables. The
SWIG in Figure 2(b) is derived from the causal
DAG in Figure 2(a) corresponding to a sequentially
randomized experiment. The SWIG represents the
counterfactual world in which A1 and A2 have been
set to (a1, a2), respectively. Richardson and Robins
(2013) show that under the (naturally associated)
FFRCISTG model the distribution of the counter-
factual variables on the SWIG factors according to
the graph. Applying Pearl’s d-separation criterion
to the SWIG we obtain the independences (3) and
(4).14
Robins (1987b) in one of the aforementioned sub-
stantive examples described an observational study
14More precisely, we obtain the SWIG independence
Y (a1, a2) ⊥ A2(a1) | A1,L(a1), that implies (4) by the con-
sistency assumption after instantiating A1 at a1. Note when
checking d-separation on a SWIG all paths containing red
“fixed” nonrandom vertices, such as a1, are treated as always
being blocked (regardless of the conditioning set).
of the effect of formaldehyde exposure on the mor-
tality of rubber workers which can represented by
the causal graph in Figure 3(a). (This graph cannot
represent a sequential RCT because the treatment
variable A1 and the response L have an unmeasured
common cause.) Follow-up begins at time of hire;
time 1 on the graph. The vertices H1, A1, H2, L2,
A2, Y are indicators of sensitivity to eye irritants,
formaldehyde exposure at time 1, lung cancer, cur-
rent employment, formaldehyde exposure at time 2
and survival. Data on eye-sensitivity and lung can-
cer were not collected. Formaldehyde is a known eye-
irritant. The presence of an arrow fromH1 to A1 but
not from H1 to A2 reflects the fact that subjects
who believe their eyes to be sensitive to formalde-
hyde are given the discretion to choose a job with-
out formaldehyde exposure at time of hire but not
later. The arrow from H1 to L reflects the fact that
eye sensitivity causes some subjects to leave employ-
ment. The arrows from H2 to L2 and Y reflects the
fact that lung cancer causes both death and loss of
employment. The fact that H1 and H2 are indepen-
dent reflects the fact that eye sensitivity is unrelated
to the risk of lung cancer.
From the SWIG in Figure 3(b), we can see that
(6) holds so we have randomization with respect to
Y but L(a1) is not independent of A1. It follows
that the g-formula f∗a1,a2(y) equals the density of
Y (a1, a2) even though (i) the distribution of L(a1)
is not identified and (ii) neither of the individual
terms f(l | a1) and f(y | a1, l, a2) occurring in the
g-formula has a causal interpretation.15
15Above we have assumed the variables A1, L, A2, Y oc-
curring in the g-formula are temporally ordered. Interestingly,
Robins (1986, Section 11) showed identification by the g-
formula can require a nontemporal ordering. In his analysis
of the Healthy Worker Survivor Effect, data were available on
ROBINS’ CAUSAL ETIOLOGY 7
Fig. 3. Formaldehyde study: H1, indicator of sensitivity to eye irritants; A1, formaldehyde exposure at time 1; H2, lung
cancer; L, current employment; A2, formaldehyde exposure at time 2; Y , survival. H1 and H2 are unmeasured. (a) A causal
DAG G in which initial treatment is confounded, while the second treatment is sequentially randomized; (b) the SWIG G(a1, a2).
L is known to have no direct effect on Y except indirectly via the effect on A2; H1 influences A1 but not A2. See text for
further explanation.
Subsequently, Tian and Pearl (2002a) developed a
graphical algorithm for nonparametric identification
that is “complete” in the sense that if the algorithm
fails to derive an identifying formula, then the causal
quantity is not identified (Shpitser and Pearl, 2006;
Huang and Valtorta, 2006). This algorithm strictly
extends the set of causal identification results ob-
tained by Robins for static regimes.
2.4 Dynamic Regimes
The “g” in “g-formula” and elsewhere in Robins’
work refers to generalized treatment regimes g. The
set G of all such regimes includes dynamic regimes
in which a subject’s treatment at time 2 depends
on the response L to the treatment at time 1.
An example of a dynamic regime is the regime in
which all subjects receive anti-retroviral treatment
at time 1, but continue to receive treatment at time
2 only if their CD4 count at time 2 is low, indi-
cating that they have not yet responded to anti-
retroviral treatment. In our study with no baseline
covariates and A1 and A2 binary, a dynamic regime
g can be written as g = (a1, g2(l)) where the function
g2(l) specifies the treatment to be given at time 2.
The dynamic regime above has (a1 = 1, g2(l) = 1− l)
temporally ordered variables (A1,L1,A2,L2, Y ) where the Lt
are indicators of survival until time year t, At is the indicator
of exposure to a lung carcinogen and, there exists substantive
background knowledge that carcinogen exposure at t cannot
cause death within a year. Under these assumptions, Robins
proved that equation (6) was false if one respected temporal
order and chose L to be L1, but was true if one chose L= L2.
Thus, E[Y (a1, a2)] was identified by the g-formula f
∗
a1,a2(y)
only for L=L2. See (Richardson and Robins, 2013, page 54)
for further details.
and is highlighted in Figure 4. If L is binary, then
G consists of 8 regimes comprised of the 4 ear-
lier static regimes (a1, a2) and 4 dynamic regimes.
The g-formula density associated with a regime
g = (a1, g2(l)) is
f∗g (y, l)≡ f(l | a1)f(y |A1 = a1,L= l,A2 = g2(l)).
Letting Y (g) be a subject’s counterfactual outcome
under regime g, Robins (1987b) proves that if both
of the following hold:
Y (g)⊥ A1,
(9)
Y (g)⊥ A2 |A1 = a1, L= l









f(y |A1 = a1,L= l,A2 = g2(l))
· f(l | a1).
Robins (1987b) refers to (9) as the assumption that
regime g is randomized with respect to Y . Given a
causal DAG, Dynamic SWIGs (dSWIGS) can be
used to check whether (9) holds. Tian (2008) gives
a complete graphical algorithm for identification of
the effect of dynamic regimes based on DAGs.
Independences (3) and (4) imply that (9) is true
for all g ∈G. For a drug treatment, for which, say,
higher outcome values are better, the optimal regime
gopt maximizing E[Y (g)] over g ∈G is almost always
a dynamic regime, as treatment must be discontin-
ued when toxicity, a component of L, develops.
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Fig. 4. Tree graphs depicting specific treatment regimes: (a) a1 = a2 = 1; (b) the dynamic regime a1 = 1, a2 = (1− l). The
red paths indicate all possible observed data sequences under these regimes.
Robins (1986, 1989, page 1423) used the g-nota-
tion f(y | g) as a shorthand for fY (g)(y) in order
to emphasize that this was the density of Y had
intervention g been applied to the population. In the
special case of static regimes (a1, a2), he wrote f(y |
g = (a1, a2)).
16
2.5 Statistical Limitations of the Estimated
g-Formulae
Consider a sequentially randomized experiment.
In this context, randomization probabilities f(a1)
and f(a2 | a1, l) are known by design; however, the
densities f(y | a1, a2, l) and f(l | a1) are not known
and, therefore, they must be replaced by estimates
f̂(y | a1, a2, l2) and f̂(l | a1) in the g-formula. If the
sample size is moderate and l is high dimensional,
these estimates must come from fitting dimension-
reducing models. Model misspecification will then
lead to biased estimators of the mean of Y (a1, a2).
Robins (1986) and Robins and Wasserman (1997)
described a serious nonrobustness of the g-formula:
the so-called “null paradox”: In biomedical trials,
it is frequently of interest to consider the possi-
bility that the sharp causal null hypothesis of no
effect of either A1 or A2 on Y holds. Under this
null, the causal DAG generating the data is as in
Figure 2 except without the arrows from A1, A2
16Pearl (1995a) introduced an identical notation except
that he substituted the word “do” for “g =,” thus writing
f(y | do(a1, a2)).
and L into Y .17 Then, under this null, although
f∗a1,a2(y) =
∑
l f(y | a1, l, a2)f(l | a1) does not de-
pend on (a1, a2), nonetheless both f(y | a1, l, a2) and
f(l | a1) will, in general, depend on a1 (as may be
seen via d-connection).18 In general, if L has discrete
components, it is not possible for standard nonsat-
urated parametric models (e.g., logistic regression
models) for both f(y | a1, a2, l2) and f(l2 | a1) to
be correctly specified, and thus depend on a1 and
yet for f∗a1,a2(y) not to depend on a1.
19 As a conse-
quence, inference based on the estimated g-formula
must result in the sharp null hypothesis being falsely
rejected with probability going to 1, as the trial size
increases, even when it is true.
2.6 Structural Nested Models20
To overcome the null paradox, Robins (1989) and
Robins et al. (1992) introduced the semiparametric
structural nested distribution model (SNDMs) for
continuous outcomes Y and structural nested failure
time models (SNFTMs) for time to event outcomes.
See Robins (1997a, 1997b) for additional details.
17If the L→ Y edge is present, then A1 still has an effect
on Y .
18The dependence of f(y | a1, l, a2) on a1 does not represent
causation but rather selection bias due to conditioning on the
common effect L of H1 and A1.
19But see Cox and Wermuth (1999) for another approach.
20These models are discussed by Vansteelandt and Joffe
(2014) in this issue.
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Robins (1986, Section 6) defined the g-null hy-
pothesis as
H0 : the distribution of Y (g)
(10)
is the same for all g ∈G.
This hypothesis is implied by the sharp null hypoth-
esis of no effect of A1 or A2 on any subject’s Y . If
(9) holds for all g ∈G, then the g-null hypothesis is
equivalent to any one of the following assertions:
(i) f∗g (y) equals the factual density f(y) for all g ∈
G;
(ii) Y ⊥ A1 and Y ⊥ A2 | L,A1;
(iii) f∗a1,a2(y) does not depend on (a1, a2) and Y ⊥
A2 | L,A1;
see Robins (1986, Section 6). In addition, any one
of these assertions exhausts all restrictions on the
observed data distribution implied by the sharp null
hypothesis.
Robins’ goal was to construct a causal model in-
dexed by a parameter ψ∗ such that in a sequen-
tially randomized trial (i) ψ∗ = 0 if and only if the
g-null hypothesis (10) was true and (ii) if known, one
could use the randomization probabilities to both
construct an unbiased estimating function for ψ∗
and to construct tests of ψ∗ = 0 that were guar-
anteed (asymptotically) to reject under the null at
the nominal level. The SNDMs and SNFTMs ac-
complish this goal for continuous and failure time
outcomes Y . Robins (1989) and Robins (1994) also
constructed additive and multiplicative structural
nested mean models (SNMMs) which satisfied the
above properties except with the g-null hypothesis
replaced by the g-null mean hypothesis:
H0 :E[Y (g)] =E[Y ] for all g ∈G.(11)
As an example, we consider an additive structural
nested mean model. Define
γ(a1, l, a2)
=E[Y (a1, a2)− Y (a1,0) | L= l,A1 = a1,
A2 = a2]
and
γ(a1) =E[Y (a1,0)− Y (0,0) |A1 = a1].
Note γ(a1, l, a2) is the effect of the last blip of treat-
ment a2 at time 2 among subjects with observed
history (a1, l, a2), while γ(a1) is the effect of the
last blip of treatment a1 at time 1 among subjects
with history a1. An additive SNMM specifies para-
metric models γ(a1, l, a2;ψ2) and γ(a1;ψ1) for these
blip functions with γ(a1; 0) = γ(a1, l, a2; 0) = 0. Un-
der the independence assumptions (9), H2(ψ2)×
d(L,A1){A2−E[A2 | L,A1]} andH1(ψ){A1−E[A1]}
are unbiased estimating functions for the true
ψ∗, where H2(ψ2) = Y − γ(A1,L,A2;ψ2), H1(ψ) =
H2(ψ2)− γ(A1;ψ1), and d(L,A1) is a user-supplied
function of the same dimension as ψ2. Under the g-
null mean hypothesis (11), the SNMM is guaranteed
to be correctly specified with ψ∗ = 0. Thus, these
estimating functions when evaluated at ψ∗ = 0, can
be used in the construction of an asymptotically α-
level test of the g-null mean hypothesis when f(a1)
and f(a2 | a1, l) are known (or are consistently es-
timated).21 When L is a high-dimensional vector,
the parametric blip models may well be misspec-
ified when g-null mean hypothesis is false. How-
ever, because the functions γ(a1, l, a2) and γ(a1) are
nonparametrically identified under assumptions (9),
one can construct consistent tests of the correct-
ness of the blip models γ(a1, l, a2;ψ2) and γ(a1;ψ1).
Furthermore, one can also estimate the blip func-
tions using cross-validation (Robins (2004)) and/or
flexible machine learning methods in lieu of a pre-
specified parametric model (van der Laan and Rose
(2011)). A recent modification of a multiplicative
SNMM, the structural nested cumulative failure
time model, designed for censored time to event out-
comes has computational advantages compared to a
SNFTM, because, in contrast to a SNFTM, param-
eters are estimated using an unbiased estimating
function that is differentiable in the model parame-
ters; see Picciotto et al. (2012).
Robins (2004) also introduced optimal-regime
SNNMs drawing on the seminal work of Murphy
(2003) on semiparametric methods for the esti-
mation of optimal treatment strategies. Optimal-
regime SNNM estimation, called A-learning in com-
puter science, can be viewed as a semiparametric
implementation of dynamic programming (Bellman,
1957).22 Optimal-regime SNMMs differ from stan-
21In the literature, semiparametric estimation of the pa-
rameters of a SNM based on such estimating functions is re-
ferred to as “g-estimation.”
22Interestingly, Robins (1989, page 127 and App. 1), un-
aware of Bellman’s work, reinvented the method of dynamic
programming but remarked that, due to the difficulty of the
estimation problem, it would only be of theoretical interest
for finding the optimal dynamic regimes from longitudinal
epidemiological data.
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dard SNMMs only in that γ(a1) is redefined to be
γ(a1) =E[Y (a1, g2,opt(a1,L(a1)))
− Y (0, g2,opt(0,L(0))) |A1 = a1],
where g2,opt(a1, l) = argmaxa2 γ(a1, l, a2) is the op-
timal treatment at time 2 given past history (a1, l).
The overall optimal treatment strategy gopt is then
(a1,opt, g2,opt(a1, l)) where a1,opt = argmaxa1 γ(a1).
More on the estimation of optimal treatment regimes
can be found in Schulte et al. (2014) in this volume.
2.7 Instrumental Variables and Bounds for the
Average Treatment Effect
Robins (1989, 1993) also noted that structural
nested models can be used to estimate treatment
effects when assumptions (9) do not hold but data
are available on a time dependent instrumental vari-
able. As an example, patients sometimes fail to fill
their prescriptions and thus do not comply with





j ) for each time j, where A
p
j denotes
the treatment prescribed and Adj denotes the dose
of treatment actually received at time j. Robins
defined Apj to be an instrumental variable if (9)
still holds after replacing Aj by A
p
j and for all sub-




j ) only through
the actual dose adj . Robins noted that unlike the
case of full compliance (i.e., Apj =A
d
j with probabil-
ity 1) discussed earlier, the treatment effect func-
tions γ are not nonparametrically identified. Conse-
quently, identification can only be achieved by cor-
rectly specifying (sufficiently restrictive) parametric
models for γ.
If we are unwilling to rely on such parametric as-
sumptions, then the observed data distribution only
implies bounds for the γ’s. In particular, in the set-
ting of a point treatment randomized trial with non-
compliance and the instrument Ap1 being the as-
signed treatment, Robins (1989) obtained bounds on
the average causal effect E[Y (ad = 1) − Y (ad = 0)]
of the received treatment Ad. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper was the first to derive bounds
for nonidentified causal effects defined through po-
tential outcomes.23 The study of such bounds has
become an active area of research. Other early pa-
pers include Manski (1990) and Balke and Pearl
23See also Robins and Greenland (1989a, 1989b).
(1994).24 See Richardson et al. (2014) in this vol-
ume for a survey of recent research on bounds.
2.8 Limitations of Structural Nested Models
Robins (2000) noted that there exist causal ques-
tions for which SNMs are not altogether satisfac-
tory. As an example, for Y binary, Robins (2000)
proposed a structural nested logistic model in order
to ensure estimates of the counterfactual mean of Y
were between zero and one. However, he noted that
knowledge of the randomization probabilities did
not allow one to construct unbiased estimating func-
tion for its parameter ψ∗. More importantly, SNMs
do not directly model the final object of public
health interest—the distribution or mean of the out-
come Y as function of the regimes g—as these dis-
tributions are generally functions not only of the pa-
rameters of the SNM but also of the conditional law
of the time dependent covariates L given the past
history. In addition, SNMs constitute a rather large
conceptual leap from standard associational regres-
sion models familiar to most statisticians. Robins
(1998, 2000) introduced a new class of causal mod-
els, marginal structural models, that overcame these
particular difficulties. Robins also pointed out that
MSMs have their own shortcomings, which we dis-
cuss below. Robins (2000) concluded that the best
causal model to use will vary with the causal ques-
tion of interest.
2.9 Dependent Censoring and Inverse
Probability Weighting
Marginal Structural Models grew out of Robins’
work on censoring and inverse probability of censor-
ing weighted (IPCW) estimators. Robins work on
dependent censoring was motivated by the famil-
iar clinical observation that patients who did not
return to the clinic and were thus censored differed
from other patients on important risk factors, for ex-
ample measures of cardio-pulmonary reserve. In the
1970s and 1980s, the analysis of right censored data
was a major area of statistical research, driven by
the introduction of the proportional hazards model
(Cox (1972); Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980)) and
by martingale methods for their analysis (Aalen
(1978); Andersen et al. (1993); Fleming and Har-
rington (1991)). This research, however, was focused
24Balke and Pearl (1994) showed that Robins’ bounds were
not sharp in the presence of “defiers” (i.e., subjects who would
never take the treatment assigned) and derived sharp bounds
in that case.
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on independent censoring. An important insight in
Robins (1986) was the recognition that by refram-
ing the problem of censoring as a causal inference
problem as we will now explain, it was possible to
adjust for dependent censoring with the g-formula.
Rubin (1978a) had pointed out previously that
counterfactual causal inference could be viewed as
a missing data problem. Robins (1986, page 1491)
recognized that the converse was indeed also true: a
missing data problem could be viewed as a problem
in counterfactual causal inference.25 Robins concep-
tualized right censoring as just another time depen-
dent “treatment” At and one’s inferential goal as
the estimation of the outcome Y under the static
regime g “never censored.” Inference based on the
g-formula was then licensed provided that censoring
was explainable in the sense that (6) holds. This ap-
proach to dependent censoring subsumed indepen-
dent censoring as the latter is a special case of the
former.
Robins, however, recognized once again that in-
ference based on the estimated g-formula could be
nonrobust. To overcome this difficulty, (Robins and
Rotnitzky, 1992) introduced IPCW tests and esti-
mators whose properties are easiest to explain in
the context of a two-armed RCT of a single treat-
ment (A1). The standard Intention-to-Treat (ITT)
analysis for comparing the survival distributions in
the two arms is a log-rank test. However, data are
often collected on covariates, both pre- and post-
randomization, that are predictive of the outcome
as well as (possibly) of censoring. An ITT analy-
sis that tries to adjust for dependent-censoring by
IPCW uses estimates of the arm-specific hazards of
censoring as functions of past covariate history. The
proposed IPCW tests have the following two advan-
tages compared to the log rank test. First, if cen-
soring is dependent but explainable by the covari-
ates, the log-rank test is not asymptotically valid. In
contrast, IPCW tests asymptotically reject at their
nominal level provided the arm-specific hazard es-
timators are consistent. Second, when censoring is
independent, although both the IPCW tests and the
log-rank test asymptotically reject at their nominal
level, the IPCW tests, by making use of covariates,
can be more powerful than the log-rank test even
25A viewpoint recently explored by Mohan, Pearl and Tian
(2013).
against proportional-hazards alternatives. Even un-
der independent censoring tests based on the esti-
mated g-formula are not guaranteed to be asymp-
totically α-level, and hence are not robust.
To illustrate, we consider here an RCT with
A1 being the randomization indicator, L a post-
randomization covariate, A2 the indicator of cen-
soring and Y the indicator of survival. For simplic-
ity, we assume that any censoring occurs at time 2
and that there are no failures prior to time 2. The
IPCW estimator β̂ of the ITT effect β∗ =E[Y |A=
1]−E[Y |A= 0] is defined as the solution to
Pn[I(A2 = 0)U(β)/P̂r(A2 = 0 | L,A1)] = 0,(12)
where U(β) = (Y − βA1)(A1 − 1/2), throughout Pn
denotes the empirical mean operator and P̂r(A2 =
0 | L,A1) is an estimator of the arm-specific condi-
tional probability of being uncensored. When first
introduced in 1992, IPCW estimators, even when
taking the form of simple Horvitz–Thompson esti-
mators, were met with both surprise and suspicion
as they violated the then widely held belief that one
should never adjust for a post-randomization vari-
able affected by treatment in a RCT.
2.10 Marginal Structural Models
Robins (1993, Remark A1.3, pages 257–258) noted
that, for any treatment regime g, if randomization
w.r.t. Y , that is, (9), holds, Pr{Y (g) > y} can be
estimated by IPCW if one defines a person’s cen-
soring time as the first time he/she fails to take
the treatment specified by the regime. In this set-
ting, he referred to IPCW as inverse probability of
treatment weighted (IPTW). In actual longitudinal
data in which either (i) treatment Ak is measured at
many times k or (ii) the Ak are discrete with many
levels or continuous, one often finds that few study
subjects follow any particular regime. In response,
Robins (1998, 2000) introduced MSMs. These mod-
els address the aforementioned difficulty by borrow-
ing information across regimes. Additionally, MSMs
represent another response to the g-null paradox
complementary to Structural Nested Models.
To illustrate, suppose that in our example of Sec-
tion 2, A1 and A2 now have many levels. An in-
stance of an MSM for the counterfactual means
E[Y (a1, a2)] is a model that specifies that
Φ−1{E[Y (a1, a2)]}= β∗0 + γ(a1, a2;β∗1),
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where Φ−1 is a given link function such as the logit,
log, or identity link and γ(a1, a2;β1) is a known func-
tion satisfying γ(a1, a2; 0) = 0. In this model, β1 = 0
encodes the static-regime mean null hypothesis that
H0 :E[Y (a1, a2)] is the same for all (a1, a2).(13)
Robins (1998) proposed IPTW estimators (β̂0, β̂1)
of (β∗0 , β
∗
1). When the treatment probabilities are
known, these estimators are defined as the solution
to
Pn[Wv(A1,A2)(Y −Φ{β0 + γ(A1,A2;β1)})]
(14)
= 0
for a user supplied vector function v(A1,A2) of the
dimension of (β∗0 , β
∗
1) where
W = 1/{f(A1)f(A2 |A1,L)}.
Informally, the product f(A1)f(A2 | A1,L) is the
“probability that a subject had the treatment his-
tory he did indeed have.”26 When the treatment
probabilities are unknown, they are replaced by es-
timators.
Intuitively, the reason why the estimating func-
tion of (14) has mean zero at (β∗0 , β
∗
1) is as fol-
lows: Suppose the data had been generated from a
sequentially randomized trial represented by DAG
in Figure 2. We may create a pseudo-population
by making 1/{f(A1)f(A2 | A1,L)} copies of each
study subject. It can be shown that in the resulting
pseudo-population A2 ⊥ {L,A1}, and thus is repre-
sented by the DAG in Figure 2, except with both
arrows into A2 removed. In the pseudo-population,
treatment is completely randomized (i.e., there is
no confounding by either measured or unmeasured
variables), and hence causation is association. Fur-
ther, the mean of Y (a1, a2) takes the same value in
the pseudo-population as in the actual population.
Thus if, for example, γ(a1, a2;β1) = β1,1a1 + β1,2a2
and Φ−1 is the identity link, we can estimate (β∗0 , β
∗
1)
by OLS in the pseudo-population. However, OLS
in the pseudo-population is precisely weighted least
26IPTW estimators and IPCW estimators are essentially
equivalent. For instance, in the censoring example of Sec-
tion 2.9, on the event A2 = 0 of being uncensored, the
IPCW denominator p̂r(A2 = 0 | L,A1) equals f(A2 | A1,L),
the IPTW denominator.
squares in the actual study population with weights
1/{f(A1)f(A2 |A1,L)}.27
Robins (2000, Section 4.3) also noted that the
weights W can be replaced by the so-called stabi-
lized weights SW = {f(A1)f(A2 |A1)}/{f(A1)f(A2 |
A1,L)}, and described settings where, for efficiency
reasons, using SW is preferable to using W .
MSMs are not restricted to models for the depen-
dence of the mean of Y (a1, a2) on (a1, a2). Indeed,
one can consider MSMs for the dependence of any
functional of the law of Y (a1, a2) on (a1, a2), such as
a quantile or the hazard function if Y is a time-to-
event variable. If the study is fully randomized, that
is, (1) holds, then an MSM model for a given func-
tional of the law of Y (a1, a2) is tantamount to an
associational model for the same functional of the
law of Y conditional on A1 = a1 and A2 = a2. Thus,
under (1), the MSM model can be estimated using
standard methods for estimating the corresponding
associational model. If the study is only sequentially
randomized, that is, (6) holds but (1) does not, then
the model can still be estimated by the same stan-
dard methods but weighting each subject by W or
SW .
Robins (2000) discussed disadvantages of MSMs
compared to SNMs. Here, we summarize some of
the main drawbacks. Suppose (9) holds for all g ∈G.
If the g-null hypothesis (10) is false but the static
regime null hypothesis that the law of Y (a1, a2) is
the same for all (a1, a2) is true, then by (iii) of
Section 2.6, f(y | A1 = a1,A2 = a2,L = l) will de-
pend on a2 for some stratum (a1, l) thus imply-
27More formally, recall that under (6), E[Y (a1, a2)] =
Φ{β∗0 +γ(a1, a2;β
∗
1 )} is equal to the g-formula
∫
yf∗a1,a2(y)dy.
Now, given the joint density of the data f(A1,L,A2, Y ), define
f̃(A1,L,A2, Y ) = f(Y |A1,L,A2)f̃2(A2)f(L |A1)f̃1(A1),
where f̃1(A1)f̃2(A2) are user-supplied densities chosen so that
f̃ is absolutely continuous with respect to f . Since the g-
formula depends on the joint density of the data only through
f(Y |A1,L,A2) and f(L |A1), then it is identical under f̃ and
under f . Furthermore, for each a1, a2 the g-formula under f̃
is just equal to Ẽ[Y |A1 = a1,A2 = a2] since, under f̃ , A2 is
independent of {L,A1}. Consequently, for any q(A1,A2)






· (Y −Φ{β∗0 + γ(A1,A2;β
∗
1 )})],
where the second equality follows from the Radon–Nikodym
theorem. The result then follows by taking q(A1,A2) =
v(A1,A2)/{f̃(A1)f̃(A2)}.
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ing a causal effect of A2 in that stratum; estima-
tion of an SNM model would, but estimation of an
MSM model would not, detect this effect. A second
drawback is that estimation of MSM models, suffers
from marked instability and finite-sample bias in the
presence of weights W that are highly variable and
skewed. This is not generally an issue in SNM es-
timation. A third limitation of MSMs is that when
(6) fails but an instrumental variable is available,
one can still consistently estimate the parameters of
a SNM but not of an MSM.28
An advantage of MSMs over SNMs that was not
discussed in Section 2.8 is the following. MSMs can
be constructed that are indexed by easily inter-
pretable parameters that quantify the overall effects
of a subset of all possible dynamic regimes (Hernán
et al. (2006); van der Laan and Petersen (2007);
Orellana, Rotnitzky and Robins (2010a, 2010b). As
an example consider a longitudinal study of HIV
infected patients with baseline CD4 counts exceed-
ing 600 in which we wish to determine the optimal
CD4 count at which to begin anti-retroviral treat-
ment. Let gx denote the dynamic regime that speci-
fies treatment is to be initiated the first time a sub-
ject’s CD4 count falls below x, x ∈ {1,2, . . . ,600}.
Let Y (gx) be the associated counterfactual response
and suppose few study subjects follow any given
regime. If we assume E[Y (gx)] varies smoothly with
x, we can specify and fit (by IPTW) a dynamic





say, h(x) is a vector of appropriate spline functions.
3. DIRECT EFFECTS
Robins’ analysis of sequential regimes leads imme-
diately to the consideration of direct effects. Thus,
perhaps not surprisingly, all three of the distinct di-
rect effect concepts that are now an integral part
of the causal literature are all to be found in his
early papers. Intuitively, all the notions of direct ef-
fect consider whether “the outcome (Y ) would have
been different had cause (A1) been different, but the
level of (A2) remained unchanged.” The notions dif-
fer regarding the precise meaning of A2 “remained
unchanged.”
3.1 Controlled Direct Effects
In a setting in which there are temporally or-
dered treatments A1 and A2, it is natural to wonder
28Note that, as observed earlier, in this case identification is
achieved through parametric assumptions made by the SNM.
whether the first treatment has any effect on the
final outcome were everyone to receive the second
treatment. Formally, we wish to compare the poten-
tial outcomes Y (a1 = 1, a2 = 1) and Y (a1 = 0, a2 =
1). Robins (1986, Section 8) considered such con-
trasts, that are now referred to as controlled direct
effects. More generally, the average controlled direct
effect of A1 on Y when A2 is set to a2 is defined to
be
CDE(a2)≡E[Y (a1 = 1, a2)− Y (a1 = 0, a2)],(15)
where Y (a1 = 1, a2)−Y (a1 = 0, a2) is the individual
level direct effect. Thus, if A2 takes k-levels then
there are k such contrasts.
Under the causal graph shown in Figure 5(a), in
contrast to Figures 2 and 3, the effect of A2 on Y is
unconfounded, by either measured or unmeasured
variables, association is causation and thus, under
the associated FFRCISTG model:
CDE(a2) = E[Y |A1 = 1,A2 = a2]
−E[Y |A1 = 0,A2 = a2].
The CDE can be identified even in the presence
of time-dependent confounding. For example, in the
context of the FFRCISTG associated with either
of the causal DAGs shown in Figures 2 and 3,
the CDE(a2) will be identified via the difference in





The CDE requires that the potential outcomes
Y (a1, a2) be well-defined for all values of a1 and a2.
This is because the CDE treats both A2 and A1 as
causes, and interprets “A2 remained unchanged” to
mean “had there been an intervention on A2 fixing
it to a2.”
This clearly requires that the analyst be able to
describe a well-defined intervention on the mediat-
ing variable A2.
There are many contexts in which there is no clear
well-defined intervention on A2 and thus it is not
meaningful to refer to Y (a1, a2). The CDE is not
applicable in such contexts.
3.2 Principal Stratum Direct Effects (PSDE)
Robins (1986) considered causal contrasts in the
situation described in Section 2.9 in which death
from a disease of interest, for example, a heart at-
tack, may be censored by death from other diseases.
29See (7).
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Fig. 5. (a) A causal DAG G with no (measured or unmeasured) confounding of A2 on Y ; (b) the SWIG G(a1, a2) resulting
from intervening on A1 and A2.
To describe these contrasts, we suppose A1 is a
treatment of interest, Y = 1 is the indicator of death
from the disease of interest (in a short interval sub-
sequent to a given fixed time t) and A2 = 0 is the “at
risk indicator” denoting the absence of death either
from other diseases or the disease of interest prior
to time t.
Earlier Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) had ar-
gued that if A2 = 1, so that the subject does not
survive to time t, then the question of whether the
subject would have died of heart disease subsequent
to t had death before t been prevented is meaning-
less. In the language of counterfactuals, they were
saying (i) that if A1 = a1 and A2 ≡A2(a1) = 1, the
counterfactual Y (a1, a2 = 0) is not well-defined and
(ii) the counterfactual Y (a1, a2 = 1) is never well-
defined.
Robins (1986, Section 12.2) observed that if one
accepts this then the only direct effect contrast that
is well-defined is Y (a1 = 1, a2 = 0)− Y (a1 = 0, a2 =
0) and that is well-defined only for those subjects
who would survive to t regardless of whether they re-
ceived a1 = 0 or a1 = 1. In other words, even though
Y (a1, a2) may not be well-defined for all subjects
and all a1, a2, the contrast:
E[Y (a1 = 0, a2)− Y (a1 = 1, a2) |
(16)
A2(a1 = 1) =A2(a1 = 0) = a2]
is still well-defined when a2 = 0. As noted by Robins,
this could provide a solution to the problem of defin-
ing the causal effect of the treatment A1 on the out-
come Y in the context of censoring by death due to
other diseases.
Rubin (1998) and Frangakis and Rubin (1999,
2002) later used this same contrast to solve precisely
the same problem of “censoring by death.”30
30The analysis of Rubin (2004) was also based on this con-
trast, with A2 no longer a failure time indicator so that the
contrast (16) could be considered as well-defined for any value
of a2 for which the conditioning event had positive probabil-
ity.
In the terminology of Frangakis and Rubin (2002)
for a subject with A2(a1 = 1) =A2(a1 = 0) = a2, the
individual principal stratum direct effect is defined
to be:31
Y (a1 = 1, a2)− Y (a1 = 0, a2)
(here, A1 is assumed to be binary). The average
PSDE in principal stratum a2 is then defined to be
PSDE(a2)≡ E[Y (a1 = 1, a2)− Y (a1 = 0, a2) |
A2(a1 = 1) =A2(a1 = 0) = a2]
(17)
= E[Y (a1 = 1)− Y (a1 = 0) |
A2(a1 = 1) =A2(a1 = 0) = a2],
where the second equality here follows, since Y (a1,
A2(a1)) = Y (a1).
32 In contrast to the CDE, the
PSDE has the advantage that it may be defined, via
(17), without reference to potential outcomes involv-
ing intervention on a2. Whereas the CDE views A2
as a treatment, the PSDE treats A2 as a response.
Equivalently, this contrast interprets “had A2 re-
mained unchanged” to mean “we restrict attention
to those people whose value of A2 would still have
been a2, even under an intervention that set A1 to
a different value.”
Although the PSDE is an interesting parame-
ter in many settings (Gilbert, Bosch and Hudgens
(2003)), it has drawbacks beyond the obvious (but
perhaps less important) ones that neither the pa-
rameter itself nor the subgroup conditioned on are
nonparametrically identified. In fact, having just
defined the PSDE parameter, Robins (1986) crit-
icized it for its lack of transitivity when there is
a non-null direct effect of A1 and A1 has more
than two levels; that is, for a given a2, the PS-
DEs comparing a1 = 0 with a1 = 1 and a1 = 1
31For subjects for whom A2(a1 = 1) 6=A2(a1 = 0), no prin-
cipal stratum direct effect (PSDE) is defined.
32This follows from consistency.
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with a1 = 2 may both be positive but the PSDE
comparing a1 = 0 with a1 = 2 may be negative.
Robins, Rotnitzky and Vansteelandt (2007) noted
that the PSDE is undefined when A1 has an effect
on every subject’s A2, a situation that can easily
occur if A2 is continuous. In that event, a natural
strategy would be to, say, dichotomize A2. However,
Robins, Rotnitzky and Vansteelandt (2007) showed
that the PSDE in principal stratum a∗2 of the di-
chotomized variable may fail to retain any mean-
ingful substantive interpretation.
3.3 Pure Direct Effects (PDE)33
Once it has been established that a treatment A1
has a causal effect on a response Y , it is natural to
ask what “fraction” of a the total effect may be at-
tributed to a given causal pathway. As an example,
consider a RCT in nonhypertensive smokers of the
effect of an anti-smoking intervention (A1) on the
outcome myocardial infarction (MI) at 2 years (Y ).
For simplicity, assume everyone in the intervention
arm and no one in the placebo arm quit cigarettes,
that all subjects were tested for new-onset hyper-
tension A2 at the end of the first year, and no sub-
ject suffered an MI in the first year. Hence, A1, A2
and Y occur in that order. Suppose the trial showed
smoking cessation had a beneficial effect on both
hypertension and MI. It is natural to consider the
query: “What fraction of the total effect of smoking
cessation A1 on MI Y is through a pathway that
does not involve hypertension A2?”
Robins and Greenland (1992) formalized this
question via the following counterfactual contrast,
which they termed the “pure direct effect”:
Y {a1 = 1,A2(a1 = 0)} − Y {a1 = 0,A2(a1 = 0)}.
The second term here is simply Y (a1 = 0).
34 The
contrast is thus the difference between two quanti-
ties: first, the outcome Y that would result if we
set a1 to 1, while “holding fixed” a2 at the value
A2(a1 = 0) that it would have taken had a1 been
0; second, the outcome Y that would result from
simply setting a1 to 0 [and thus having A2 again
take the value A2(a1 = 0)]. Thus, the Pure Direct
Effect interprets had “A2 remained unchanged” to
mean “had (somehow) A2 taken the value that it
33Pearl (2001) adopted the definition given by Robins and
Greenland (1992) but changed nomenclature. He refers to the
pure direct effect as a “natural” direct effect.
34This follows by consistency.
would have taken had we fixed A1 to 0.” The con-
trast thus represents the effect of A1 on Y had the
effect of A1 on hypertension A2 been blocked. As
for the CDE, to be well-defined, potential outcomes
Y (a1, a2) must be well-defined. As a summary mea-
sure of the direct effect of (a binary variable) A1 on
Y , the PDE has the advantage (relative to the CDE
and PSDE) that it is a single number.
The average pure direct effect is defined as35
PDE =E[Y {a1 = 1,A2(a1 = 0)}]
−E[Y (a1 = 0,A2(a1 = 0))].
Thus, the ratio of the PDE to the total effect
E[Y {a1 = 1}]− E[Y {a1 = 0}] is the fraction of the
total that is through a pathway that does not involve
hypertension (A2).
Unlike the PSDE, the PDE is an average over
the full population. However, unlike the CDE, the
PDE is not nonparametrically identified under the
FFRCISTG model associated with the simple DAG
shown in Figure 5(a). Robins and Richardson (2011,
App. C) computed bounds for the PDE under the
FFRCISTG associated with this DAG.
Pearl (2001) obtains identification of the PDE un-
der the DAG in Figure 5(a) by imposing stronger
counterfactual independence assumptions, via a
Nonparametric Structural Equation Model with In-
dependent Errors (NPSEM-IE).36 Under these as-




{E[Y |A1 = 1,A2 = a2]
35Robins and Greenland (1992) also defined the total indi-
rect effect (TIE) of A1 on Y through A2 to be
E[Y {a1 = 1,A2(a1 = 1)}]−E[Y {a1 = 1,A2(a1 = 0)}].
It follows that the total effect E[Y {a1 = 1}]− E[Y {a1 = 0}]
can then be decomposed as the sum of the PDE and the TIE.
36In more detail, the FFRCISTG associated with Fig-
ures 5(a) and (b) assumes for all a1, a2,
Y (a1, a2),A2(a1)⊥ A1, Y (a1, a2)⊥ A2(a1) |A1,(18)
which may be read directly from the SWIG shown in Fig-
ure 5(b); recall that red nodes are always blocked when apply-
ing d-separation. In contrast, Pearl’s NPSEM-IE also implies
the independence
Y (a1, a2)⊥ A2(a
∗
1) |A1,(19)
when a1 6= a
∗
1. Independence (19), which is needed in order
for the PDE to be identified, is a “cross-world” independence
since Y (a1, a2) and A2(a
∗
1) could never (even in principle)
both be observed in any randomized experiment.
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−E[Y |A1 = 0,A2 = a2]}(20)
· P (A2 = a2 |A1 = 0),
which he calls the “Mediation Formula.”
Robins and Richardson (2011) noted that the
additional assumptions made by the NPSEM-IE
are not testable, even in principle, via a random-
ized experiment. Consequently, this formula rep-
resents a departure from the principle, originating
with Neyman (1923), that causation be reducible
to experimental interventions, often expressed in
the slogan “no causation without manipulation.”37
Robins and Richardson (2011) achieve a rapproche-
ment between these opposing positions by showing
that the formula (20) is equal to the g-formula asso-
ciated with an intervention on two treatment vari-
ables not appearing on the graph (but having de-
terministic relations with A1) under the assumption
that one of the variables has no direct effect on A2
and the other has no direct effect on Y . Hence, under
this assumption and in the absence of confounding,
the effect of this intervention on Y is point identified
by (20).38
Although there was a literature on direct ef-
fects in linear structural equation models (see, e.g.,
Blalock (1971)) that preceded Robins (1986) and
Robins and Greenland (1992), the distinction be-
tween the CDE and PDE did not arise since in linear
models these notions are equivalent.39
37A point freely acknowledged by Pearl (2012) who argues
that causation should be viewed as more primitive than in-
tervention.
38This point identification is not a “free lunch”:
Robins and Richardson (2011) show that it is these additional
assumptions that have reduced the FFRCISTG bounds for
the PDE to a point. This is a consequence of the fact that
these assumptions induce a model for the original variables
{A1,A2(a1), Y (a1, a2)} that is a strict submodel of the origi-
nal FFRCISTG model.
Hence to justify applying the mediation formula by this
route one must first be able to specify in detail the additional
treatment variables and the associated intervention so as to
make the relevant potential outcomes well-defined. In addi-
tion, one must be able to argue on substantive grounds for
the plausibility of the required no direct effect assumptions
and deterministic relations.
It should also be noted that even under Pearl’s NPSEM-
IE model the PDE is not identified in causal graphs, such
as those in Figures 2 and 3 that contain a variable (whether
observed or unobserved) that is present both on a directed
pathway from A1 to A2 and on a pathway from A1 to Y .
39Note that in a linear structural equation model the PSDE
is not defined unless A1 has no effect on A2.
3.4 The Direct Effect Null
Robins (1986, Section 8) considered the null hy-
pothesis that Y (a1, a2) does not depend on a1 for
all a2, which we term the sharp null-hypothesis of
no direct effect of A1 on Y (relative to A2) or more
simply as the “sharp direct effect null.”
In the context of our running example with data
(A1,L,A2, Y ), under (6) the sharp direct effect null
implies the following constraint on the observed data
distribution:
f∗a1,a2(y) is not a function of a1 for all a2.(21)
Robins (1986, Sections 8 and 9) noted that this con-
straint (21) is not a conditional independence. This
is in contrast to the g-null hypothesis which we have
seen is equivalent to the independencies in (ii) of
Section 2.6 [when equation (9) holds for all g ∈G].40
He concluded that, in contrast to the g-null hypoth-
esis, the constraint (21), and thus the sharp direct
effect null, cannot be tested using case control data
with unknown case and control sampling fractions.41
This constraint (21) was later independently discov-
ered by Verma and Pearl (1990) and for this reason
is called the “Verma constraint” in the Computer
Science literature.
Robins (1999b) noted that, though (21) is not a
conditional independence in the observed data dis-
tribution, it does correspond to a conditional in-
dependence, but in a weighted distribution with
weights proportional to 1/f(A2 | A1,L).42 This can
be understood from the informal discussion follow-
ing equation (14) in the previous section: there it
was noted that given the FFRCISTG corresponding
to the DAG in Figure 2, reweighting by 1/f(A2 |
A1,L) corresponds to removing both edges into A2.
Hence, if the edges A1 → Y and L → Y are not
present, so that the sharp direct effect null holds,
as in Figure 6(a), then the reweighted population is
40 Results in Pearl (1995b) imply that under the sharp di-
rect effect null the FFRCISTGs associated with the DAGs
shown in Figures 2 and 3 also imply inequality restrictions
similar to Bell’s inequality in Quantum Mechanics. See Gill
(2014) for discussion of statistical issues arising from experi-
mental tests of Bell’s inequality.
41To our knowledge, it is the first such causal null hypoth-
esis considered in Epidemiology for which this is the case.
42This observation motivated the development of graphical
“nested” Markov models that encode constraints such as (21)
in addition to ordinary conditional independence relations;
see the discussion of “Causal Discovery” in Section 7 below.
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Fig. 6. (a) A DAG representing the sequentially randomized experiment shown in Figure 2 but where there is no direct effect
of A1 on Y relative to A2; (b) a DAG representing the pseudo-population obtained by re-weighting the distribution with weights
proportional to 1/f(A2 | L,A1).
described by the DAG in Figure 6(b). It then fol-
lows from the d-separation relations on this DAG
that Y ⊥ A1 |A2 in the reweighted distribution.
This fact can also be seen as follows. If, in our
running example from Section 2.2, A1, A2, Y are
all binary, the sharp direct effect null implies that
β∗1 = β
∗
3 = 0 in the saturated MSM with
Φ−1{E[Y (a1, a2)]}= β∗0 + β∗1a1 + β∗2a2 + β∗3a1a2.
Since β∗1 and β
∗
3 are the associational parameters
of the weighted distribution, their being zero im-
plies the conditional independence Y ⊥ A1 |A2 un-
der this weighted distribution.
In more complex longitudinal settings, with the
number of treatment times k exceeding 2, all the
parameters multiplying terms containing a particu-
lar treatment variable in a MSM may be zero, yet
there may still be evidence in the data that the sharp
direct effect null for that variable is false. This is di-
rectly analogous to the limitation of MSMs relative
to SNMs with regard to the sharp null hypothesis
(10) of no effect of any treatment that we noted at
the end of Section 2.10. To overcome this problem,
Robins (1999b) introduced direct effect structural
nested models. In these models, which involve treat-
ment at k time points, if all parameters multiplying
a given aj take the value 0, then we can conclude
that the distribution of the observables do not refute
the natural extension of (21) to k times. The latter
is implied by the sharp direct effect null that aj has
no direct effect on Y holding aj+1, . . . , ak fixed.
4. THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS AND
BAYESIAN INFERENCE
Robins and Ritov (1997) and Robins and Wasser-
man (2000) recognized that the lack of robustness
of estimators based on the g-formula in a sequen-
tial randomized trial with known randomization
probabilities had implications for the foundations
of statistics and for Bayesian inference. To make
their argument transparent, we will assume in our
running example (from Section 2.2) that the den-
sity of L is known and that A1 = 1 with probabil-
ity 1 (hence we drop A1 from the notation). We
will further assume the observed data are n i.i.d.
copies of a random vector (L,A2, Y ) with A2 and
Y binary and L a d × 1 continuous vector with
support on the unit cube (0,1)d. We consider a
model for the law of (L,A2, Y ) that assumes that
the density f∗(l) of L is known, that the treat-
ment probability π∗(l) ≡ Pr(A2 = 1 | L = l) lies in
the interval (c,1− c) for some known c > 0 and that
b∗(l, a2) ≡ E[Y | L = l,A2 = a2] is continuous in l.















and (b, π) ∈ B ×Π. Here B is the set of continuous
functions from (0,1)d ×{0,1} to (0,1) and Π is the
set of functions from (0,1)d to (c,1− c).
We assume the goal is inference about µ(b) where
µ(b) =
∫
b(l,1)f∗(l)dl. Under randomization, that is
(3) and (4), µ(b∗) is the counterfactual mean of Y
when treatment is given at both times.
When π∗ is unknown, Robins and Ritov (1997)
showed that no estimator of µ(b∗) exists that is uni-
formly consistent over all B ×Π. They also showed
that even if π∗ is known, any estimator that does not
use knowledge of π∗ cannot be uniformly consistent
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over B×{π∗} for all π∗. However, there do exist es-
timators that depend on π∗ that are uniformly
√
n-
consistent for µ(b∗) over B × {π∗} for all π∗. The
Horvitz–Thompson estimator Pn{A2Y/π∗(L)} is a
simple example.
Robins and Ritov (1997) concluded that, in this
example, any method of estimation that obeys the
likelihood principle such as maximum likelihood or
Bayesian estimation with independent priors on b
and π, must fail to be uniformly consistent. This
is because any procedure that obeys the likelihood
principle must result in the same inference for µ(b∗)
regardless of π∗, even when π∗ becomes known.
Robins and Wasserman (2000) noted that this ex-
ample illustrates that the likelihood principle and
frequentist performance can be in severe conflict in
that any procedure with good frequentist properties
must violate the likelihood principle.43 Ritov et al.
(2014) in this volume extends this discussion in
many directions.
5. SEMIPARAMETRIC EFFICIENCY AND
DOUBLE ROBUSTNESS IN MISSING DATA
AND CAUSAL INFERENCE MODELS
Robins and Rotnitzky (1992) recognized that the
inferential problem of estimation of the mean E[Y (g)]
(when identified by the g-formula) of a response Y
under a regime g is a special case of the general
problem of estimating the parameters of an arbi-
trary semi-parametric model in the presence of data
that had been coarsened at random (Heitjan and
Rubin (1991)).44
43In response Robins (2004, Section 5.2) offered a Bayes–
frequentist compromise that combines honest subjective
Bayesian decision making under uncertainty with good fre-
quentist behavior even when, as above, the model is so large
and the likelihood function so complex that standard (un-
compromised) Bayes procedures have poor frequentist per-
formance. The key to the compromise is that the Bayesian
decision maker is only allowed to observe a specified vector
function of X [depending on the known π∗(X)] but not X
itself.
44Given complete data X , an always observed coarsening
variable R, and a known coarsening function x(r) = c(r,x),
coarsening at random (CAR) is said to hold if Pr(R = r |
X) depends only on X(r), the observed data part of X .
Robins and Rotnitzky (1992), Gill, van der Laan and Robins
(1997) and Cator (2004) showed that in certain models as-
suming CAR places no restrictions on the distribution of the
observed data. For such models, we can pretend CAR holds
when our goal is estimation of functionals of the observed
data distribution. This trick often helps to derive efficient es-
This viewpoint led them to recognize that the
IPCW and IPTW estimators described earlier were
not fully efficient. To obtain efficient estimators,
Robins and Rotnitzky (1992) and Robins, Rot-
nitzky and Zhao (1994) used the theory of semi-
parametric efficiency bounds (Bickel et al. (1993);
van der Vaart (1991)) to derive representations for
the efficient score, the efficient influence function,
the semiparametric variance bound, and the influ-
ence function of any asymptotically linear estima-
tor in this general problem. The books by Tsiatis
(2006) and by van der Laan and Robins (2003) pro-
vide thorough treatments. The generality of these
results allowed Robins and his principal collabora-
tors Mark van der Laan and Andrea Rotnitzky to
solve many open problems in the analysis of semi-
parametric models. For example, they used the ef-
ficient score representation theorem to derive lo-
cally efficient semiparametric estimators in many
models of importance in biostatistics. Some exam-
ples include conditional mean models with miss-
ing regressors and/or responses (Robins, Rotnitzky
and Zhao (1994); Rotnitzky and Robins (1995)), bi-
variate survival (Quale, van der Laan and Robins
(2006)) and multivariate survival models with ex-
plainable dependent censoring (van der Laan, Hub-
bard and Robins (2002)).45
timators of the functional. In this section, we assume that
the distribution of the observables is compatible with CAR,
and further, that in the estimation problems that we consider,
CAR may be assumed to hold without loss of generality.
In fact, this is the case in the context of our run-
ning causal inference example from Section 2.2. Specifi-
cally, let X = {Y (a1, a2),L(a1);aj ∈ {0,1}, j = 1,2}, R =
(A1,A2), and X(a1,a2) = {Y (a1, a2),L(a1)}. Consider a
model MX for X that specifies (i) {Y (1, a2),L(1);a2 ∈
{0,1}} ⊥ {Y (0, a2),L(0);a2 ∈ {0,1}} and (ii) Y (a1,1) ⊥
Y (a1,0) | L(a1) for a1 ∈ {0,1}. Results in Gill and Robins
(2001, Section 6) and Robins (2000, Sections 2.1 and 4.2)
show that (a) model MX places no further restrictions
on the distribution of the observed data (A1,A2,L,Y ) =
(A1,A2,L(A1), Y (A1,A2)), (b) given model MX , the addi-
tional independences X ⊥ A1 and X ⊥ A2 | A1,L together
also place no further restrictions on the distribution of the
observed data (A1,A2,L,Y ) and are equivalent to assuming
CAR. Further, the independences in (b) imply (9) so that
fY (g)(y) is identified by the g-formula f
∗
g (y).
45More recently, in the context of a RCT, Tsiatis et al.
(2008) and Moore and van der Laan (2009), following the
strategy of Robins and Rotnitzky (1992), studied variants of
the locally efficient tests and estimators of Scharfstein, Rot-
nitzky and Robins (1999) to increase efficiency and power by
utilizing data on covariates.
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In coarsened at random data models, whether
missing data or causal inference models, locally ef-
ficient semiparametric estimators are also doubly
robust (Scharfstein, Rotnitzky and Robins (1999),
pages 1141–1144) and (Robins and Rotnitzky (2001)).
See the book (van der Laan and Robins (2003))
for details and for many examples of doubly ro-
bust estimators. Doubly robust estimators had
been discovered earlier in special cases. In fact,
Firth and Bennett (1998) note that the so-called
model-assisted regression estimator of a finite popu-
lation mean of Cassel, Särndal and Wretman (1976)
is design consistent which is tantamount to being
doubly robust. See Robins and Rotnitzky (2001) for
other precursors.
In the context of our running example, from Sec-
tion 2.2, suppose (6) holds. An estimator µ̂dr of
µ = E[Y (a1, a2)] = f
∗
a1,a2(1) for, say a1 = a2 = 1, is
said to be doubly robust (DR) if it is consistent when
either (i) a model for π(L)≡ Pr(A2 = 1 |A1 = 1,L)
or (ii) a model for b(L)≡E[Y |A1 = 1,L,A2 = 1] is
correct. When L is high dimensional and, as in an
observational study, π(·) is unknown, double robust-
ness is a desirable property because model misspec-
ification is generally unavoidable, even when we use
flexible, high dimensional, semiparametric models in
(i) and (ii). In fact, DR estimators have advantages
even when, as is usually the case, the models in (i)
and (ii) are both incorrect. This happens because
the bias of the DR estimator µ̂dr is of second order,
and thus generally less than the bias of a non-DR
estimator (such as a standard IPTW estimator). By
second order, we mean that the bias of µ̂dr depends
on the product of the error made in the estimation
of Pr(A2 = 1 |A1 = 1,L) times the error made in the
estimation of E[Y |A1 = 1,L,A2 = 1].
Scharfstein, Rotnitzky and Robins (1999) noted
that the locally efficient estimator of Robins, Rot-
















is doubly robust where π̂(L) and b̂(L) are estimators
of π(L) and b(L). Unfortunately, in finite samples
this estimator may fail to lie in the parameter space
for µ, that is, the interval [0,1] if Y is binary. In
response, Scharfstein, Rotnitzky and Robins (1999)
proposed a plug-in DR estimator, the doubly robust
regression estimator
µ̂dr,reg = {Pn[A1]}−1Pn{A1b̂(L)},
where now b̂(L) = expit{m(L; η̂) + θ̂/π̂(L)} and
(η̂, θ̂) are obtained by fitting by maximum likelihood
the logistic regression model Pr(Y = 1 | A1 = 1,
L,A2 = 1) = expit{m(L;η) + θ/π̂(L)} to subjects
with A1 = 1, A2 = 1. Here,m(L;η) is a user-specified
function of L and of the Euclidean parameter η.
Robins (1999a) and Bang and Robins (2005) ob-
tained plug-in DR regression estimators in longitu-
dinal missing data and causal inference models by
reexpressing the g-formula as a sequence of iterated
conditional expectations.
van der Laan and Rubin (2006) proposed a clever
general method for obtaining plug-in DR estima-
tors called targeted maximum likelihood. In our
setting, the method yields an estimator µ̂dr,TMLE
that differs from µ̂dr,reg only in that b̂(L) is now
given by expit{m̂(L) + θ̂greedy/π̂(L)} where θ̂greedy
is again obtained by maximum likelihood but with
a fixed offset m̂(L). This offset is an estimator of
Pr(Y = 1 | A1 = 1,L,A2 = 1) that might be ob-
tained using flexible machine learning methods.
Similar comments apply to models considered by
Bang and Robins (2005). Since 2006 there has been
an explosion of research that has produced dou-
bly robust estimators with much improved large
sample efficiency and finite sample performance;
Rotnitzky and Vansteelandt (2014) give a review.
We note that CAR models are not the only models
that admit doubly robust estimators. For example,
Scharfstein, Rotnitzky and Robins (1999) exhibited
doubly robust estimators in models with nonignor-
able missingness. Robins and Rotnitzky (2001) de-
rived sufficient conditions, satisfied by many non-
CAR models, that imply the existence of doubly ro-
bust estimators. Recently, doubly robust estimators
have been obtained in a wide variety of models. See
Dudik et al. (2014) in this volume for an interesting
example.
6. HIGHER ORDER INFLUENCE FUNCTIONS
It may happen that the second-order bias of a
doubly-robust estimator µ̂dr decreases slower to 0
with n than n−1/2, and thus the bias exceeds the
standard error of the estimator. In that case, con-
fidence intervals for µ based on µ̂dr fail to cover
at their nominal rate even in large samples. Fur-
thermore, in such a case, in terms of mean squared
error, µ̂dr does not optimally trade off bias and
variance. In an attempt to address these problems,
Robins et al. (2008) developed a theory of point and
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interval estimation based on higher order influence
functions and use this theory to construct estima-
tors of µ that improve on µ̂dr. Higher order in-
fluence functions are higher order U-statistics. The
theory of Robins et al. (2008) extends to higher or-
der the first order semiparametric inference theory
of Bickel et al. (1993) and van der Vaart (1991). In
this issue, van der Vaart (2014) gives a masterful re-
view of this theory. Here, we present an interesting
result found in Robins et al. (2008) that can be un-
derstood in isolation from the general theory and
conclude with an open estimation problem.
Robins et al. (2008) consider the question of
whether, for estimation of a conditional variance,
random regressors provide for faster rates of con-
vergence than do fixed regressors, and, if so, how?
They consider a setting in which n i.i.d. copies of
(Y,X) are observed with X a d-dimensional random
vector, with bounded density f(·) absolutely con-
tinuous w.r.t. the uniform measure on the unit cube
(0,1)d. The regression function b(·) = E[Y | X = ·]
is assumed to lie in a given Hölder ball with Hölder
exponent β < 1.46 The goal is to estimate E[Var{Y |
X}] under the homoscedastic semiparametric model
Var[Y |X] = σ2. Under this model, the authors con-
struct a simple estimator σ̂2 that converges at rate
n−(4β/d)/(1+4β/d), when β/d < 1/4.
Wang et al. (2008) and Cai, Levine and Wang
(2009) earlier proved that if Xi, i = 1, . . . , n, are
nonrandom but equally spaced in (0,1)d, the min-
imax rate of convergence for the estimation of σ2
is n−2β/d (when β/d < 1/4) which is slower than
n−(4β/d)/(1+4β/d). Thus, randomness in X allows for
improved convergence rates even though no smooth-
ness assumptions are made regarding f(·).
To explain how this happens, we describe the
estimator of Robins et al. (2008). The unit cube
in Rd is divided into k = k(n) = nγ , γ > 1 identi-
cal subcubes each with edge length k−1/d. A sim-
ple probability calculation shows that the number
of subcubes containing at least two observations
is Op(n
2/k). One may estimate σ2 in each such
subcube by (Yi − Yj)2/2.47 An estimator σ̂2 of σ2
may then be constructed by simply averaging the
46A function b(·) lies in the Hölder ball H(β,C) with Hölder
exponent β > 0 and radius C > 0, if and only if b(·) is bounded
in supremum norm by C and all partial derivatives of b(x) up
to order ⌊β⌋ exist, and all partial derivatives of order ⌊β⌋ are
Lipschitz with exponent (β − ⌊β⌋) and constant C.
47If a subcube contains more than two observations, two
are selected randomly, without replacement.
subcube-specific estimates (Yi − Yj)2/2 over all the
sub-cubes with at least two observations. The rate
of convergence of the estimator is maximized at
n−(4β/d)/(1+4β/d) by taking k = n2/(1+4β/d).48
Robins et al. (2008) conclude that the random de-
sign estimator has better bias control, and hence
converges faster than the optimal equal-spaced
fixed X estimator, because the random design es-
timator exploits the Op(n
2/n2/(1+4β/d)) random
fluctuations for which the X ’s corresponding to
two different observations are only a distance of
O({n2/(1+4β/d)}−1/d) apart.
An Open Problem49
Consider again the above setting with random X .
Suppose that β/d remains less than 1/4 but now
β > 1. Does there still exist an estimator of σ2 that
converges at n−(4β/d)/(1+4β/d)? Analogy with other
nonparametric estimation problems would suggest
the answer is “yes,” but the question remains un-
solved.50
7. OTHER WORK
The available space precludes a complete treat-
ment of all of the topics that Robins has worked on.
We provide a brief description of selected additional
topics and a guide to the literature.
Analyzing Observational Studies as Nested
Randomized Trials
Hernán et al. (2008) and Hernán, Robins and
Garćıa Rodŕıguez (2005) conceptualize and ana-
lyze observational studies of a time varying treat-
48 Observe that E[(Yi − Yj)
2/2 | Xi,Xj ] = σ
2 + {b(Xi) −
b(Xj)}
2/2, |b(Xi) − b(Xj)| = O(‖Xi − Xj‖
β) as β < 1, and
‖Xi −Xj‖= d
1/2O(k−1/d) when Xi and Xj are in the same
subcube. It follows that the estimator has variance of order
k/n2 and bias of order O(k−2β/d). Variance and the squared
bias are equated by solving k/n2 = k−4β/d which gives k =
n2/(1+4β/d).
49 Robins has been trying to find an answer to this question
without success for a number of years. He suggested that it is
now time for some crowd-sourcing.
50The estimator given above does not attain this rate when
β > 1 because it fails to exploit the fact that b(·) is differen-
tiable. In the interest of simplicity, we have posed this as a
problem in variance estimation. However, Robins et al. (2008)
show that the estimation of the variance is mathematically
isomorphic to the estimation of θ in the semi-parametric re-
gression model E[Y |A,X] = θA+ h(X), where A is a binary
treatment. In the absence of confounding, θ encodes the causal
effect of the treatment.
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ment as a nested sequence of individual RCTs tri-
als run by nature. Their analysis is closely re-
lated to g-estimation of SNM (discussed in Sec-
tion 2.6). The critical difference is that in these
papers Robins and Hernán do not specify a SNM
to coherently link the trial-specific effect estimates.
This has benefits in that it makes the analysis eas-
ier and also more familiar to users without training
in SNMs. The downside is that, in principle, this
lack of coherence can result in different analysts rec-
ommending, as optimal, contradictory interventions
(Robins, Hernán and Rotnitzky 2007).
Adjustment for “Reverse Causation”
Consider an epidemiological study of a time- de-
pendent treatment (say cigarette smoking) on time
to a disease of interest, say clinical lung cancer.
In this setting, uncontrolled confounding by unde-
tected preclinical lung cancer (often referred to as
“reverse causation”) is a serious problem. Robins
(2008) develops analytic methods that may still pro-
vide an unconfounded effect estimate, provided that
(i) all subjects with preclinical disease severe enough
to affect treatment (i.e., smoking behavior) at a
given time t will have their disease clinically diag-
nosed within the next x, say 2 years and (ii) based
on subject matter knowledge an upper bound, for
example, 3 years, on x is known.
Causal Discovery
Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993) and Pearl
and Verma (1991) proposed statistical methods that
allowed one to draw causal conclusions from asso-
ciational data. These methods assume an underly-
ing causal DAG (or equivalently an FFRCISTG). If
the DAG is incomplete, then such a model imposes
conditional independence relations on the associ-
ated joint distribution (via d-separation). Spirtes,
Glymour and Scheines (1993) and Pearl and Verma
(1991) made the additional assumption that all con-
ditional independence relations that hold in the dis-
tribution of the observables are implied by the un-
derlying causal graph, an assumption termed “sta-
bility” by Pearl and Verma (1991), and “faithful-
ness” by Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993).
Under this assumption, the underlying DAG may
be identified up to a (“Markov”) equivalence class.
Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993) proposed two
algorithms that recover such a class, entitled “PC”
and “FCI.” While the former presupposes that there
are no unobserved common causes, the latter explic-
itly allows for this possibility.
Robins and Wasserman (1999) and Robins et al.
(2003) pointed out that although these procedures
were consistent they were not uniformly consistent.
More recent papers (Kalisch and Bühlmann (2007);
Colombo et al. (2012)) recover uniform consistency
for these algorithms by imposing additional assump-
tions. Spirtes and Zhang (2014) in this volume ex-
tend this work by developing a variant of the PC Al-
gorithm which is uniformly consistent under weaker
assumptions.
Shpitser et al. (2012, 2014), building on Tian and
Pearl (2002b) and Robins (1999b) develop a theory
of nested Markov models that relate the structure of
a causal DAG to conditional independence relations
that arise after re-weighting; see Section 3.4. This
theory, in combination with the theory of graphical
Markov models based on Acyclic Directed Mixed
Graphs (Richardson and Spirtes (2002); Richard-
son (2003); Wermuth (2011); Evans and Richardson
(2014); Sadeghi and Lauritzen (2014)), will facilitate
the construction of more powerful51 causal discov-
ery algorithms that could (potentially) reveal much
more information regarding the structure of a DAG
containing hidden variables than algorithms (such
as FCI) that solely use conditional independence.
Extrapolation and Transportability of Treatment
Effects
Quality longitudinal data is often only avail-
able in high resource settings. An important ques-
tion is when and how can such data be used to
inform the choice of treatment strategy in low
resource settings. To help answer this question,
Robins, Orellana and Rotnitzky (2008) studied the
extrapolation of optimal dynamic treatment strate-
gies between two HIV infected patient populations.
The authors considered the treatment strategies gx,
of the same form as those defined in Section 2.10,
namely, “start anti-retroviral therapy the first time
at which the measured CD4 count falls below x.”
Given a utility measure Y , their goal is to find the
regime gxopt that maximizes E[Y (gx)] in the sec-
ond low-resource population when good longitudi-
nal data are available only in the first high-resource
population. Due to differences in resources, the fre-
quency of CD4 testing in the first population is much
51But still not uniformly consistent!
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greater than in the second and, furthermore, for lo-
gistical and/or financial reasons, the testing frequen-
cies cannot be altered. In this setting, the authors
derived conditions under which data from the first
population is sufficient to identify gxopt and con-
struct IPTW estimators of gxopt under those condi-
tions. A key finding is that owing to the differential
rates of testing, a necessary condition for identifica-
tion is that CD4 testing has no direct causal effect
on Y not through anti-retroviral therapy. In this is-
sue, Pearl and Bareinboim (2014) study the related
question of transportability between populations us-
ing graphical tools.
Interference, Interactions and Quantum
Mechanics
Within a counterfactual causal model, Cox (1958)
defined there to be interference between treatments
if the response of some subject depends not only
on their treatment but on that of others as well. On
the other hand, VanderWeele and Robins (2009) de-
fined two binary treatments (a1, a2) to be causally
interacting to cause a binary response Y if for
some unit Y (1,1) 6= Y (1,0) = Y (0,1); VanderWeele
(2010a) defined the interaction to be epistatic if
Y (1,1) 6= Y (1,0) = Y (0,1) = Y (0,0). VanderWeele
with his collaborators has developed a very gen-
eral theory of empirical tests for causal interac-
tion of different types (VanderWeele and Robins
(2009); VanderWeele (2010a), 2010b; VanderWeele
and Richardson (2012)).
Robins, VanderWeele and Gill (2012) showed, per-
haps surprisingly, that this theory could be used to
give a simple but novel proof of an important re-
sult in quantum mechanics known as Bell’s theo-
rem. The proof was based on two insights: The first
was that the consequent of Bell’s theorem could,
by using the Neyman causal model, be recast as
the statement that there is interference between a
certain pair of treatments. The second was to recog-
nize that empirical tests for causal interaction can
be reinterpreted as tests for certain forms of interfer-
ence between treatments, including the form needed
to prove Bell’s theorem. VanderWeele et al. (2012)
used this latter insight to show that existing em-
pirical tests for causal interactions could be used to
test for interference and spillover effects in vaccine
trials and in many other settings in which inter-
ference and spillover effects may be present. The
papers Ogburn and VanderWeele (2014) and Van-
derWeele, Tchetgen Tchetgen and Halloran (2014)
in this issue contain further results on interference
and spillover effects.
Multiple Imputation
Wang and Robins (1998) and Robins and Wang
(2000) studied the statistical properties of the mul-
tiple imputation approach to missing data (Rubin
(1987)). They derived a variance estimator that is
consistent for the asymptotic variance of a multi-
ple imputation estimator even under misspecifica-
tion and incompatibility of the imputation and the
(complete data) analysis model. They also charac-
terized the large sample bias of the variance estima-
tor proposed by Rubin (1978b).
Posterior Predictive Checks
Robins, van der Vaart and Ventura (2000) stud-
ied the asymptotic null distributions of the poste-
rior predictive p-value of Rubin (1984) and Guttman
(1967) and of the conditional predictive and partial
posterior predictive p-values of Bayarri and Berger
(2000). They found the latter two p-values to have
an asymptotic uniform distribution; in contrast they
found that the posterior predictive p-value could be
very conservative, thereby diminishing its power to
detect a misspecified model. In response, Robins et
al. derived an adjusted version of the posterior pre-
dictive p-value that was asymptotically uniform.
Sensitivity Analysis
Understanding that epidemiologists will almost
never succeed in collecting data on all covariates
needed to fully prevent confounding by unmeasured
factors and/or nonignorable missing data, Robins
with collaborators Daniel Scharfstein and Andrea
Rotnitzky developed methods for conducting sensi-
tivity analyses. See, for example, Scharfstein, Rot-
nitzky and Robins (1999), Robins, Rotnitzky and
Scharfstein (2000) and Robins (2002, pages 319–
321). In this issue, Richardson et al. (2014) describe
methods for sensitivity analysis and present several
applied examples.
Public Health Impact
Finally, we have not discussed the large impact
of the methods that Robins introduced on the sub-
stantive analysis of longitudinal data in epidemiol-
ogy and other fields. Many researchers have been
involved in transforming Robins’ work on time-
varying treatments into increasingly reliable, robust
analytic tools and in applying these tools to help
answer questions of public health importance.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
CAR: Section 5 coarsened at random.
CD4: Section 2.2 (medical) cell line depleted by
HIV.
CDE: Section 3.1 controlled direct effect.
CMA: Section 2.3 causal Markov assumption.
DAG: Section 2.3 directed acyclic graph.
DR: Section 5 doubly robust.
dSWIG: Section 2.4 dynamic single-world interven-
tion graph.
FFRCISTG: Section 2.2 finest fully randomized causally
interpreted structured tree
graph.
HIV: Section 2.2 (medical) human immunodefi-
ciency virus.
IPCW: Section 2.9 inverse probability of censoring
weighted.
IPTW: Section 2.10 inverse probability of treatment
weighted.
ITT: Section 2.9 intention to treat.
MI: Section 3.3 (medical) myocardial infarction.
MSM: Section 2.10 marginal structural model.
NPSEM: Section 2.2 nonparametric structural equa-
tion model.
NPSEM-IE: Section 2.2 nonparametric structural equa-
tion model with independent er-
rors.
PDE: Section 3.3 pure direct effects.
PSDE: Section 3.2 principal stratum direct effects.
RCT: Section 2.2 randomized clinical trial.
SNM: Section 2.6 structural nested model.
SNDM: Section 2.6 structural nested distribution
model.
SNFTM: Section 2.6 structural nested failure time
model.
SNMM: Section 2.6 structural nested mean model.
SWIG: Section 2.3 single-world intervention graph.
TIE: Section 3.3 total indirect effect.
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probabilités aux experiences agricoles: Essai des principes.
Roczniki Nauk Rolniczych X 1–51. In Polish. English trans-
lation by D. Dabrowska and T. Speed in Statist. Sci. 5
(1990) 463–472.
Ogburn, E. L. and VanderWeele, T. J. (2014). Causal
diagrams for interference. Statist. Sci. 29 559–578.
Orellana, L., Rotnitzky, A. and Robins, J. M. (2010a).
Dynamic regime marginal structural mean models for es-
timation of optimal dynamic treatment regimes. Part I:
Main content. Int. J. Biostat. 6 Art. 8, 49. MR2602551
Orellana, L., Rotnitzky, A. and Robins, J. M. (2010b).
Dynamic regime marginal structural mean models for es-
timation of optimal dynamic treatment regimes. Part II:
Proofs of results. Int. J. Biostat. 6 Art. 9, 19. MR2602552
Pearl, J. (1988). Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Sys-
tems: Networks of Plausible Inference. Morgan Kaufmann,
San Mateo, CA. MR0965765
Pearl, J. (1995a). Causal diagrams for empirical research.
Biometrika 82 669–710. With discussion and a rejoinder
by the author. MR1380809
Pearl, J. (1995b). On the testability of causal models with
latent and instrumental variables. In Proceedings of the
11th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial In-
telligence 435–443. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA.
MR1615027
Pearl, J. (2000). Causality. Models, Reasoning, and Infer-
ence. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge. MR1744773
Pearl, J. (2001). Direct and indirect effects. In Proceedings
of the 17th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial
Intelligence 411–442. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco,
CA.
Pearl, J. (2012). Eight myths about causality and struc-
tural equation models. Technical Report R-393, Computer
Science Dept., UCLA.
Pearl, J. and Bareinboim, E. (2014). External validity:
From do-calculus to transportability across populations.
Statist. Sci. 29 579–595.
Pearl, J. and Verma, T. S. (1991). A theory of inferred cau-
sation. In Principles of Knowledge Representation and Rea-
soning (Cambridge, MA, 1991). Morgan Kaufmann Ser.
Represent. Reason. 441–452. Morgan Kaufmann, San Ma-
teo, CA. MR1142173
Picciotto, S., Hernán, M. A., Page, J. H., Young, J. G.
and Robins, J. M. (2012). Structural nested cumulative
failure time models to estimate the effects of interventions.
J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 107 886–900. MR3010878
Quale, C. M., van der Laan, M. J. and Robins, J. R.
(2006). Locally efficient estimation with bivariate right-
censored data. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 101 1076–1084.
MR2324147
ROBINS’ CAUSAL ETIOLOGY 25
Richardson, T. S. (2003). Markov properties for acyclic
directed mixed graphs. Scand. J. Stat. 30 145–157.
MR1963898
Richardson, T. S. and Robins, J. M. (2013). Single World
Intervention Graphs (SWIGs): A unification of the coun-
terfactual and graphical approaches to causality. Technical
Report 128, Center for Statistics and the Social Sciences,
Univ. Washington, Seattle, WA.
Richardson, T. S. and Spirtes, P. (2002). Ancestral graph
Markov models. Ann. Statist. 30 962–1030. MR1926166
Richardson, A., Hudgens, M. G., Gilbert, P. B. and
Fine, J. P. (2014). Nonparametric bounds and sensitivity
analysis of treatment effects. Statist. Sci. 29 596–618.
Ritov, Y., Bickel, P. J., Gamst, A. C. and
Kleijn, B. J. K. (2014). The Bayesian analysis of
complex, high-dimensional models: Can it be CODA?
Statist. Sci. 29 619–639.
Robins, J. M. (1986). A new approach to causal inference
in mortality studies with a sustained exposure period—
Application to control of the healthy worker survivor effect.
Mathematical models in medicine: Diseases and epidemics.
Part 2. Math. Modelling 7 1393–1512. MR0877758
Robins, J. M. (1987a). A graphical approach to the identi-
fication and estimation of causal parameters in mortality
studies with sustained exposure periods. J. Chronic. Dis.
40 Suppl 2 139S–161S.
Robins, J. M. (1987b). Addendum to: “A new approach
to causal inference in mortality studies with a sustained
exposure period—Application to control of the healthy
worker survivor effect.” Comput. Math. Appl. 14 923–945.
MR0922792
Robins, J. M. (1989). The analysis of randomized and non-
randomized AIDS treatment trials using a new approach to
causal inference in longitudinal studies. In Health Service
Research Methodology: A Focus on AIDS (L. Sechrest,
H. Freeman and A. Mulley, eds.). U.S. Public Health
Service, Washington, DC.
Robins, J. M. (1992). Estimation of the time-dependent ac-
celerated failure time model in the presence of confounding
factors. Biometrika 79 321–334. MR1185134
Robins, J. M. (1993). Analytic methods for estimating HIV-
treatment and cofactor effects. In Methodological Issues in
AIDS Behavioral Research 213–288. Springer, New York.
Robins, J. M. (1994). Correcting for non-compliance in
randomized trials using structural nested mean models.
Comm. Statist. Theory Methods 23 2379–2412. MR1293185
Robins, J. M. (1997a). Causal inference from complex lon-
gitudinal data. In Latent Variable Modeling and Applica-
tions to Causality (Los Angeles, CA, 1994). Lecture Notes
in Statist. 120 69–117. Springer, New York. MR1601279
Robins, J. M. (1997b). Structural nested failure time models.
In Survival Analysis (P. K. Andersen and N. Keiding,
Section eds.), Encyclopedia of Biostatistics (P. Armitage
and T. Colton, eds.) 4372–4389. Wiley, New York.
Robins, J. M. (1998). Marginal structural models. In 1997
ASA Proceedings of the Section on Bayesian Statistical Sci-
ence 1–10. Amer. Statist. Assoc., Alexandria, VA.
Robins, J. M. (1999a). Robust estimation in sequentially ig-
norable missing data and causal inference models. In ASA
Proceedings of the Section on Bayesian Statistical Science
6–10. Americ. Statist. Assoc., Alexandria, VA.
Robins, J. M. (1999b). Testing and estimation of direct
effects by reparameterizing directed acyclic graphs with
structural nested models. In Computation, Causation, and
Discovery (C. Glymour and G. Cooper, eds.) 349–405.
AAAI Press, Menlo Park, CA. MR1696459
Robins, J. M. (2000). Marginal structural models versus
structural nested models as tools for causal inference. In
Statistical Models in Epidemiology, the Environment, and
Clinical Trials (Minneapolis, MN, 1997). IMA Vol. Math.
Appl. 116 95–133. Springer, New York. MR1731682
Robins, J. M. (2002). Comment on “Covariance adjustment
in randomized experiments and observational studies” by
P. R. Rosenbaum. Statist. Sci. 17 309–321.
Robins, J. M. (2004). Optimal structural nested models for
optimal sequential decisions. In Proceedings of the Sec-
ond Seattle Symposium in Biostatistics. Lecture Notes in
Statist. 179 189–326. Springer, New York. MR2129402
Robins, J. M. (2008). Causal models for estimating the ef-
fects of weight gain on mortality. Int. J. Obes. (Lond.) 32
Suppl 3 S15–S41.
Robins, J. M. and Greenland, S. (1989a) Estimability and
estimation of excess and etiologic fractions. Stat. Med. 8
845–859.
Robins, J. M. and Greenland, S. (1989b). The probability
of causation under a stochastic model for individual risk.
Biometrics 45 1125–1138. MR1040629
Robins, J. M. and Greenland, S. (1992). Identifiability and
exchangeability for direct and indirect effects. Epidemiol-
ogy 3 143–155.
Robins, J. M., Hernán, M. A. and Rotnitzky, A. (2007).
Invited commentary: Effect modification by time-varying
covariates. American J. Epidemiology 166 994–1002.
Robins, J. M. and Morgenstern, H. (1987). The founda-
tions of confounding in epidemiology. Comput. Math. Appl.
14 869–916. MR0922790
Robins, J. M., Orellana, L. and Rotnitzky, A. (2008).
Estimation and extrapolation of optimal treatment and
testing strategies. Stat. Med. 27 4678–4721. MR2528576
Robins, J. M. and Richardson, T. S. (2011). Alterna-
tive graphical causal models and the identification of di-
rect effects. In Causality and Psychopathology: Finding the
Determinants of Disorders and Their Cures (P. Shrout,
K. Keyes and K. Ornstein, eds.) 1–52. Oxford Univ.
Press, Oxford.
Robins, J. M. and Ritov, Y. (1997). Toward a curse of di-
mensionality appropriate (CODA) asymptotic theory for
semi-parametric models. Stat. Med. 16 285–319.
Robins, J. M. and Rotnitzky, A. (1992). Recovery of in-
formation and adjustment for dependent censoring using
surrogate markers. In AIDS Epidemiology (N. P. Jewell,
K. Dietz and V. T. Farewell, eds.) 297–331. Birkhäuser,
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